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Abstract
Some stylized facts about transactions among banks are not easily reconciled with
coinsurance of short-term liquidity risks. In our model, interbank markets play a dif-
ferent role. We argue that lending to another bank can reduce a bank’s overall portfolio
risk through diversification. If insolvency is costly, this diversification improves the
interbank lender’s funding liquidity, boosting credit supply to nonbanks. However,
diversification comes at an endogenous cost that depends on bank-specific factors of
interbank borrower and lender. The model provides a framework for understanding
the importance of interbank lending for aggregate credit supply and the stability of
banking systems. The model’s predictions are consistent with evidence documented
in the literature that other theories cannot consistently explain.
Keywords Interbank lending · Bank credit supply · Bank stability
JEL Classification E5 · G01 · G21
1 Introduction
Interbank markets are traditionally considered to be dominated by overnight deposits
and repos. These are short-term instruments traded on rather risk-intolerant markets.
Motivated by this, the academic literature has explored the role of such contracts as
instruments for banks to coinsure short-term liquidity risks (e.g., Allen and Gale 2000;
Castiglionesi et al. 2014).
B Diemo Dietrich
diemo.dietrich@newcastle.ac.uk
Achim Hauck
achim.hauck@ntu.ac.uk
1 Newcastle University, 5 Barrack Road, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK
2 Nottingham Trent University, 50 Shakespeare Street, Nottingham, UK
123
D. Dietrich, A. Hauck
While the importance of such coinsurance as a driver for interbank transactions is
widely accepted, this notion cannot be easily reconciled with three other stylized facts
about interbank markets, especially in Europe. First, the size of banks’ interbank assets
and liabilities is substantially larger than their average deposit and credit fluctuations
(Bluhm et al. 2016). Second, although the flows among banks are predominantly
short-term transactions, a substantial part of the stock of interbank claims is long term
(European Central Bank 2015). Third, the average net position of many participants
in the interbank market is substantially different from zero and persistent (Roengpitya
et al. 2017). These observations suggest that there is a need for a theory of interbank
markets which complements the established theory of interbank deposits or repos.1
Such theory should also take into account that interbank transactions are to a large
extent conducted bilaterally over the counter (Craig and von Peter 2014) and that
interbank lenders tend to be better capitalized and have better credit ratings than
interbank borrowers (Angelini et al. 2011).
We shall argue in this paper that there are economic environments where profit-
maximizing banks have an incentive to engage in interbank transactions that capture
these features. In these environments, a bank can lend funds to another bank that
may default at a later date. As long as the correlation of the two banks’ earnings is
not equal to one, assuming such counterparty risk can help the interbank lender to
better diversify its overall exposure to insolvency risk. If insolvency creates losses,
a reduction in risk will reduce the cost of external, nonbank funding sources, hence
easing the external funding constraint of the interbank lender and allowing for an
expansion of credit supply. Such diversification may be costly, though. To fully reap
the potential diversification benefits, an interbank lender may have to lend more funds
than the borrower wants to raise. In this case, the lender will have to offer a discounted
interbank lending rate, i.e., the borrower’s expected repayment will fall short of the
lender’s cost of raising the additional funds used to make the interbank loan. As a
result, interbank loans come at an expected loss to the lender, making diversification
costly. The benefits of diversification (in terms of improved access to external finance
from nonbank investors) and its cost (in terms of expected losses from granting loans
to another bank) are determined jointly in equilibrium as an interbank lender decides
how much to lend to another bank.
With a focus on the capacity of the banking sector to borrow from nonbank investors,
the present paper contributes to three related branches in the literature. The first con-
cerns the role of interbank markets for banks’ credit supply to nonbank borrowers. In
models where interbank markets facilitate the coinsurance of short-term liquidity risks,
a fixed amount of liquid assets held in the banking sector is reallocated on interbank
markets.2 Accordingly, dysfunctional interbank markets result in liquidity hoarding
and idle lending capacities, as loanable funds no longer flow to the most profitable
lending opportunities, both within and across banks (Freixas and Holthausen 2005;
Gertler and Kiyotaki 2010; Acharya and Skeie 2011; Diamond and Rajan 2011).3 In
1 We will discuss these stylized facts in detail in Sect. 6.
2 This position is explicitly taken by, e.g., Upper and Worms (2004) and Freixas et al. (2011).
3 On possible links between monetary policy, interbank markets and banks’ liquidity holdings, see Näther
(2018) and Bucher et al. (2019).
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our paper, the scope for banks to diversify risks shrinks if interbank markets become
dysfunctional. As a consequence, an interbank lender’s financial constraint tightens
which impairs its ability to grant loans to nonbanks. The interbank borrower may also
curtail lending as it has to resort to nonbank investors who may provide funds either
at higher costs or not at all.
A second strand of the literature studies the terms of interbank transactions, in
particular how they depend on risk (Furfine 2001; King 2008) and other borrower-
specific characteristics (Craig and von Peter 2014; Vollmer and Wiese 2014). Our
model suggests that the characteristics of the interbank lender are also key for the
terms of interbank transactions, in a way consistent with recent evidence (Angelini
et al. 2011; Affinito 2012). For example, an interbank lender with fewer internal
funds faces a tighter funding constraint. Hence, the lender has to gain more from
diversification and would want to grant a larger loan. However, for the interbank
borrower to accept the larger loan, the interest rate has to be smaller.
Finally, our paper is also related to a body of research on interbank linkages and
financial stability, with a particular focus on probabilities of joint bank failures. The
literature has identified contagion as one possible reason for joint failures. Since Allen
and Gale (2000), it has been argued that incomplete interbank networks are more
susceptible to contagion than complete networks because the former do not allow for
as much coinsurance of risks (see also Afonso and Lagos 2015; Craig and von Peter
2014; Craig et al. 2015).4 An alternative explanation of joint bank failures refers to
systemic risk-shifting incentives according to which banks may gain from holding sim-
ilar portfolios (Acharya and Yorulmazer 2008; Acharya 2009). We show that although
diversification is generally beneficial for a financially constrained interbank lender, it
may be better for the bank to make itself vulnerable to the failure of a counterparty
holding not identical but similar assets. Diversification benefits will be smaller, but so
will be the costs of diversification. This shows that banks do not necessarily seek a
perfectly diversified exposure on interbank markets and that incentives for banks to
hold somewhat similar assets exist beyond systemic risk-shifting.
The remainder of the paper has the following structure. In Sect. 2, we provide an
overview of the environment in which banks benefit from diversification via interbank
exposures. Having thus motivated our assumptions, we present in detail the formal
model setup in Sect. 3. In Sect. 4, we characterize the equilibrium and its implication
for credit supply. In Sect. 5, we extend the model to study the role of diversification
and associated stability issues. In Sect. 6, we discuss some empirical implications of
the model. Section 7 concludes.
2 Overview of the environment
The environment we consider in this paper has three features. These features are well
established in the literature. Importantly, they are not rival to those environments in
which banks seek to coinsure short-term liquidity risks.
4 On contagion among banks in a dynamic setting, see Tsomocos et al. (2007).
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Banks are financially constrained Banks’ equity capital is limited because building
up internal funds is a costly process that takes time (Bucher et al. 2013) and raising
funds on equity markets is subject to frictions, such as market segmentation (Allen
et al. 2015). The resulting constraints on bank loan supply can be further aggravated
by capital regulation (Behn et al. 2016). Tapping on alternative sources of funding is
also hampered. For example, the pool of insured retail deposits, although usually a
stable funding source (Martin et al. 2018), is rather fixed in size for a bank (Billett
et al. 1998), and asymmetric information generally limits the willingness of investors
to provide external funding (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981).
In our model, a bank has only a limited amount of funds at its immediate dis-
posal, for example as a result of the above-mentioned frictions in equity and deposit
markets. Furthermore, a bank’s ability to borrow more funds is impaired by asym-
metric information about its solvency. We consider a reduced form of a model in
which investors can enforce the promised payment from the bank only if they incur
the costs of verifying the bank’s earnings. Under these circumstances, the literature
has identified contracts as optimal if they specify a fixed repayment obligation and
creditors get to verify the state of the bank if it defaults (Gale and Hellwig 1985; Krasa
and Villamil 2000).5 While this contract lessens the incentive for a bank to misreport
the true state, it implies that investors incur verification costs when the bank is truly
unable to repay, which reduces their willingness to lend to the bank in the first place. In
such circumstances, any possible way to lower the probability of default, and thus of
wasting resources when a bank fails, potentially helps banks to mitigate their financial
constraints.
Diversifying and hedging risk is costly One way to reduce the probability of default
is through diversification (Diamond 1984). However, banks are typically not fully
diversified. One piece of evidence for diversification being imperfect is the substan-
tial home bias in banks’ international asset allocations (García-Herrero and Vázquez
2013). For the Euro area, there is strong evidence that banks wishing to diversify
their loan portfolio internationally are still hesitant to engage in direct cross-border
lending in the retail market. Instead, they prefer cross-border interbank lending in the
wholesale market. Despite a gradual increase in the share of direct cross-border loans
to total loans for nonfinancial corporations and households to approximately 10% in
2018, the ratio of direct cross-border retail lending to wholesale interbank lending is
still considerably below 30% (European Central Bank 2018, Charts 17 and 19). Such
patterns can be the result of credit market segmentation due to asymmetric information
problems. Typically, local banks have informational advantages over foreign banks,
which would face adverse selection problems that leave them with a pool of the least
creditworthy or even unworthy borrowers. In those environments, entry by foreign
banks in regional loan markets can reduce the screening incentives for banks through
increased competition (Gehrig 1998) or imply a lower resilience of foreign banks to
liquidity shocks (Dietrich and Vollmer 2010).
5 On the optimality of debt-like contracts in environments in which contract enforcement is costly, see also
Krasa and Villamil (1994) and Krasa et al. (2005, 2008).
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Other means of reducing risks are also costly. For example, contingent contracts
such as credit derivatives cause additional incentive problems (Hakenes and Schnabel
2010; Ahn and Breton 2014). Suppose the debt a bank issues and its loans suffer both
from costly verification problems, i.e., a bank can enforce loan repayments only if it
verifies the borrower’s income. In this scenario, buying a credit derivative will destroy
the bank’s incentive to incur any verification costs as it will be compensated anyway
when a borrower defaults. Having not been in any contractual relationship at all with
the borrower, the seller of the credit derivative has a natural disadvantage in verifying
the borrower’s true state. The borrower, in turn, will then not report the true earnings.
Such problems do not arise if the bank seeks to reduce risks through diversification as
a bank’s interest in enforcing loan repayments is maintained.
Taken together, a bank has different options to reduce risks and thus ease its financial
constraint. As each instrument comes at a cost, optimal risk management will balance
marginal costs and benefits across those instruments. Interbank lending belongs to the
set of such instruments. It allows banks to reinsure their idiosyncratic credit risk, but has
its own cost. In our model, these costs are endogenous. They exist even in the absence
of regulation, such as capital requirements for term loans to other banks, provided
the number of counterparties for interbank transactions is limited. The literature has
identified lending relationships (Affinito 2012; Bräuning and Fecht 2017) and search
costs (Afonso and Lagos 2015) as reasons for such limitations.
Information-sensitive investors exist For a bank to expect that by lowering its risk
exposure it can improve the willingness of investors to provide funds, there have to
be investors who are sensitive to information about the bank. Hence, investors should
exist who are reasonably well informed about a bank and who care about whether the
bank can fail. These characteristics usually do not apply to retail depositors, who may
not care enough about the risk of a bank failure as they are covered by some sort of
investor protection or deposit insurance scheme.
Real-world wholesale investors, such as insurance companies, pension funds or
hedge funds, however, fit well in this description (Calomiris and Kahn 1991; Huang
and Ratnovski 2011). They are professional investors who are in the business of mon-
itoring prices of bank shares and credit derivatives. Like banks, they are able to infer
banks’ individual probabilities of default from market data, and they do research into
the different business models and risk exposures of banks. For our diversification argu-
ment, investors would only need to be able to assess a bank’s probability of default
in equilibrium. In order to capture this ability of investors while keeping the analysis
simple and tractable, however, investors in our model observe interbank transactions
and their terms and know also the correlation of loan returns.6
6 The relevance of wholesale investors for banks is well documented in the literature. In 2012, wholesale
funding accounted for 61% of total liabilities of large European banks, while the respective levels for Asia,
emerging economies and large US banks ranged between 30 and 40% (Le Leslé 2012, Figure 2). See also
Oura et al. (2013, Figure 3.1 and Box 3.1).
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3 Setup
In this section, we present the baseline model. We consider a one-period economy,
populated by two banks n ∈ {1, 2} and a continuum of investors. Bank n enters
the period with some liquid endowment Ωn ≥ 0 called internal funds. Investors as
a group have plenty of funds, although an individual investor’s endowment may be
infinitesimal. Everyone is risk neutral, lives the whole period, has no time preference
and is protected by limited liability.
At the beginning of the period, each investor can use her funds to hold a portfolio
of safe assets and claims on banks. Banks can also invest in safe assets, grant risky
business loans and lend funds to each other. The potential interbank lender is called
bank 1, and the potential interbank borrower is called bank 2.
Investors’ claims on bank n are characterized by the amount dn ≥ 0 the investors
provide to the bank at the beginning of the period and a face value δn the bank has to
repay at the end (all face values are per unit). Similarly, an interbank loan contract will
stipulate the amount b ≥ 0 to be lent by bank 1 to bank 2 and a face value β that bank
2 promises to repay. Claims on banks held by investors rank pari passu with interbank
loans.
Let an ≥ 0 be the amount bank n invests in safe assets and ln ≥ 0 be the amount
invested in risky business loans. Then, the budget constraints at the beginning of the
period read
Ω1 + d1 = a1 + l1 + b,
Ω2 + d2 + b = a2 + l2. (3.1)
While access to safe assets is free, granting business loans is associated with nonpe-
cuniary, nonverifiable costs c(ln) arising from, e.g., processing applications, screening
borrowers and negotiating loan contracts. These costs are increasing and convex; to
simplify the exposition, we also assume c(0) = c′(0) = 0. One interpretation is that
business loans differ in their complexity and banks add the least complex loans first
to their portfolios.
To pay out its creditors, a bank can use its portfolio returns generated at the end of
the period. Returns on business loans are state-dependent and not freely observable.
The success of a bank’s loans can be described as a random variable that takes the
value H if loan earnings are high (success) and the value L if they are low (failure).
Denote a high return of bank n’s business loans by λn,H , a low return by λn,L (all
returns are per unit), and let pn be the probability of a low return. While business loans
do not dominate the safe assets, which yield a risk-free return α > 0, the expectation
of high loan earnings alone already exceeds the risk-free return, i.e.,
0 < λn,L < α < (1 − pn) λn,H . (3.2)
For now, we assume that business loans granted by bank 1 are a success if and only if
business loans granted by bank 2 are a failure, i.e., there are two states of the world.
Let s = L H be the state in which loan earnings for bank 1 are low, s = H L be the
state in which loan earnings for bank 2 are low, and denote the set of all states by
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S = {L H , H L}.7 The probability of state s is ps , and the return on bank n’s business
loans in state s is λn,s implying
pL H = p1, λ1,L H = λ1,L , λ2,L H = λ2,H ,
pH L = p2, λ1,H L = λ1,H , λ2,H L = λ2,L .
As realized loan earnings are not freely observed by investors, a bank could pretend
that it is unable to repay what it owes. However, if the bank does not repay, it goes
into bankruptcy which triggers a costly state verification process. All creditors of such
a failing bank, i.e., investors and potentially an interbank lender, then equally share
the value of the bank’s assets net of any costs arising from bankruptcy. Therefore, a
simple debt contract minimizes expected bankruptcy costs. To simplify matters, we
assume that the net returns the creditors of a failing bank can expect after bankruptcy
are infinitesimal, regardless of the state. Hence, while ensuring that a bank repays its
debts whenever it can, nobody gets anything meaningful if loan earnings are too low
to cover the bank’s payment obligations in full.
We formalize these assumptions by defining an indicator variable In,s , which is 1
when bank n suffers from bankruptcy in state s and 0 otherwise. A bank will be forced
into bankruptcy whenever its end-of-period book value πn,s in state s is negative, i.e.,
In,s :=
{
1 if πn,s < 0,
0 if πn,s ≥ 0, (3.3)
π1,s := λ1,sl1 + αa1 + (1 − I2,s)βb − δ1d1, (3.4)
π2,s := λ2,sl2 + αa2 − βb − δ2d2. (3.5)
For the sake of simplifying the exposition, we introduce the following definition:
Definition 1 Bank n operates in a safe mode mn = S if πn,s ≥ 0 for all s ∈ S and in
a risky mode mn = R if πn,s < 0 for all s ∈ S with λn,s = λn,L and πn,s ≥ 0 for all
s ∈ S with λn,s = λn,H .
Accordingly, a bank chooses to either go bankrupt in those states in which loan earnings
are small or to survive regardless which state materializes.8
Contracting at the beginning of the period takes place as follows. Banks negotiate
an interbank loan contract (b, β) in a simple noncooperative game. In this game,
bank 1 makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer (b∗, β∗) to bank 2. If accepted, the offer will
be implemented, i.e., (b, β) = (b∗, β∗). If bank 2 declines the offer, no interbank
transaction takes place, i.e., (b, β) = (0, 0).9
Each bank n will also decide on the details of the contract (dn, δn) offered to
investors taking their participation constraint into account. The latter requires the face
value δn of claims on bank n to satisfy
7 To study the case with correlated loan earnings, we will consider a larger set of states in Sect. 5.
8 Clearly, the option to go bankrupt regardless of which state materializes is not relevant when Ωn ≥ 0.
9 Assuming a take-it-or-leave-it structure for this bargaining game rules out that interbank market transac-
tions foster aggregate credit supply by merely lowering the average cost of lending (c(l1) + c(l2)) /(l1 +l2)
in the banking sector.
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∑
s∈S
(
1 − In,s
)
psδn ≥ α, (3.6)
that is, the expected repayments to investors at least cover the value of their next best
alternative. As investors have plenty of funds and no better option than to invest in
safe assets, their supply of funds to the banks is perfectly elastic. They are willing to
provide any volume of funds provided the face value δn satisfies
δn =
{
α if mn = S ,
α
1−pn if mn = R.
(3.7)
The objective of a bank is to maximize expected profits subject to its constraints.
These constraints are somewhat different for the interbank borrower and the interbank
lender. For any given interbank loan contract (b, β), the optimization problem of the
interbank borrower reads
max
(a2,l2,d2)∈R3+
∑
s∈S
ps max
{
π2,s, 0
} − c (l2)
s.t. (3.1), (3.5) and (3.7).
(3.8)
Let P2(b, β) denote the associated indirect expected profits for the interbank borrower
as a function of the terms of the interbank loan. Then, the optimization problem of the
interbank lender is
max
(a1,l1,d1,b,β)∈R5+
∑
s∈S
ps max
{
π1,s, 0
} − c (l1)
s.t.
{ (3.1), (3.3), (3.4) and (3.7),
P2(b, β) ≥ P2(0, 0).
(3.9)
We consider equilibria in pure strategies and without sunspots. Due to the infor-
mation asymmetry, the equilibrium allocation can differ from the first-best, which is
characterized by a loan volume lfbn satisfying
(
E
[
λn,s
] − α) − c′(lfbn ) = 0.
4 Analysis
In the present section, we analyze the optimization problem of a bank and its implica-
tions. In Sect. 4.1, we start with a bank that does not form financial links to the other
bank. This defines the outside options in the negotiations of the terms of the interbank
loan which we analyze in Sect. 4.2. We then discuss the costs associated with inter-
bank lending in Sect. 4.3 and draw conclusions regarding structure and volume of the
supply of business loans in Sect. 4.4. We discuss the nonnegativity constraints on the
interbank borrower’s internal funds and on the expected NPV of its business loans in
Sect. 4.5. We conclude this section with a remark on the choice between holding a
diversified portfolio of business loans and diversifying through interbank lending.
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4.1 Without interbank loans
If the two banks are not linked via interbank loans (b = 0), each bank chooses between
the safe and the risky mode. The advantage of the safe mode is that a bank can always
collect all earnings. The disadvantage of the safe mode is that a bank has to ensure
that it can pay investors the full face value of their claims even in the ‘bad’ state when
earnings are low. Therefore, the total amount a bank owes has to satisfy
δndn ≤ λn,Lln + αan, (4.1)
implying an upper limit on the funds a bank can obtain from investors. Together with
the budget constraint (3.1) and the face value of investor claims on the bank (3.7), it
implies that granting business loans is subject to a financial constraint, which reads
Ωn ≥ α−λn,Lα ln . (4.2)
Given assumption (3.2), a bank cannot fully refinance business loans externally
because it cannot repay investors a sufficiently large amount. There is a gap, which
depends on the amount the bank plans to lend out. If the present value of this gap
cannot be covered by internal funds, granting this amount of loans is not feasible. In
short, since internal funds are limited, the volume of business loans is limited too in
the safe mode.
In the risky mode, investors are repaid only in the state when returns are high.
Hence,
δndn ∈
]
λn,Lln + αan, λn,H ln + αan
]
. (4.3)
Combining (4.3) with (3.1) and (3.7) gives
Ωn <
α−(1−pn)λn,L
α
ln + pnan, (4.4)
Ωn ≥ α−(1−pn)λn,Hα ln + pnan . (4.5)
Restriction (4.4) states that the bank must grant a sufficiently large volume of risky
business loans to be actually exposed to the risk of bankruptcy. Restriction (4.5) looks
similar to (4.2). However, because of assumption (3.2), there is no funding gap in the
risky mode, which is the advantage over the safe mode. The disadvantage of the risky
mode is that business loans are less valuable, for bankruptcy will drive all values down
to (almost) zero in the bad state.
Without interbank loans, a bank’s optimal investment and financing decision has
the following properties.
Proposition 1 Let φn(ln) :=
(
E
[
λn,s
] − α) ln − c (ln). Provided b = β = 0, banks
maximize expected profits if
mˆn = S and lˆn = lfbn if Ωn ≥ α−λn,Lα lfbn ,
mˆn = S and lˆn = αα−λn,L Ωn if Ωn ∈
[
Ω¯n,
α−λn,L
α
lfbn
[
,
mˆn = R and lˆn = lRn if Ωn ∈
[
0, Ω¯n
[
,
(4.6)
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with lRn and Ω¯n being defined by
φ′n
(
lRn
)
= pnλn,L , (4.7)
φn
(
lRn
)
− φn
(
α
α−λn,L Ω¯n
)
= pnλn,LlRn . (4.8)
Proof See “Appendix”. unionsq
Proposition 1 shows that a bank, whose capacity to raise funds does not impose a
binding constraint on business loans, grants the first-best loan volume. If the bank’s
endowment implies that its financial constraint is binding in the safe mode, the bank
operates either in the safe mode, with loan volumes being smaller, the tighter the
constraint is, or in the risky mode. If the financial constraint in the safe mode is not
too tight, the deviation from the first-best is not too large and the bank prefers the safe
mode over the risky mode. Only if the financial constraint is sufficiently tight, i.e.,
a bank’s endowment is below Ω¯n , it prefers the risky mode because the benefits of
shaking off a relatively tight financial constraint outweigh loan earnings forgone in
the bad state.
4.2 With interbank loans
From the analysis so far, we know what happens if bank 2 does not agree to the terms
of the interbank loan contract offered by bank 1. When making a take-it-or-leave-it
offer to bank 2, bank 1 not only takes this into account but also that, if its offer is
accepted, the interbank loan affects the funding liquidity of both banks. A necessary
condition for a bank to face a financial constraint on its volume of business loans is to
operate in the safe mode. With interbank loans, these constraints are
Ω1 ≥ α−λ1,Lα l1 − β−αα b,
Ω2 ≥ α−λ2,Lα l2 − α−βα b,
(4.9)
which differ from (4.2) with respect to the second term on the RHS. For bank 1, any
dollar raised from investors at a cost of α and lent to bank 2 increases the amount
collectible in the bad state by β. If β > α, the bank can use the difference β − α to
increase the amount it can promise to repay to its investors in the safe mode. For this
effect to work, bank 1 does not rely on how much it can collect from bank 2 in the other
state, when earnings of bank 1 are high anyway. In fact, even if bank 1 takes the risk
of being unable to collect its claims on bank 2 in that state, making an interbank loan
to bank 2 will still offset the risk associated with its own business loans. Assuming
such counterparty risk lowers the bank’s total portfolio risk, enabling it to commit to
a higher face value of claims held by investors. Hence, bank 1 can attract additional
funds from investors and refinance additional business loans.
Bank 2 will have scope for additional business loans only if β < α. However,
bank 1 would never agree on interbank loans with β < α, as they neither cover their
refinancing costs nor do they help to grant more business loans. This raises the question
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why bank 2 would accept an interbank loan with β > α. If bank 2 operated in the
safe mode, such a loan would be more expensive than accepting funds directly from
investors. However, if bank 2 is in the risky mode, it repays β only with probability
1− p2 = p1. Hence, bank 2 accepts β > α as long as it will operate in the risky mode
and the expected costs of the interbank loan are not higher than those of funds from
investors, i.e., p1β ≤ α.
These insights already allow to draw two important conclusions. First, there is no
benefit to bank 1 from diversifying its portfolio with claims on bank 2 if the former
is not financially constrained even without interbank lending, i.e., if Ω1 ≥ α−λ1,Lα lfb1 .
Accordingly, provided diversification is the only reason for banks to trade in our
context, there is no need for bank 1 to lend to bank 2 although doing so would not
harm anyone either. The interbank lender would simply become an investor just like
any other investor of bank 2.10
Second, there is also no reason for interbank loans unless the interbank lender
will be safe and the interbank borrower risky. For the sake of brevity and clarity, we
henceforth focus on situations in which already in the absence of interbank markets,
the endowments of banks Ωn imply that both banks would face external funding
constraints, but while bank 1 would operate in the safe mode, bank 2 would operate
in the risky mode.11 That is, Ω1 ∈
[
Ω¯1, (α − λ1,L)lfb1 /α
[
and Ω2 ∈
[
0, Ω¯2
[
.
The optimal interbank loan contract has the following properties.
Proposition 2 Suppose Ω1 ∈
[
Ω¯1,
α−λ1,L
α
lfb1
[
and Ω2 ∈
[
0, Ω¯2
[
.
1. For α−λ1,L
α
lfb1 − Ω1 ≤ p2p1
(
lR2 − Ω2
)
the contract (b∗, β∗) satisfies
β∗ = αp1 , (4.10)
b∗ ∈
[
p1
p2
(
α−λ1,L
α
lfb1 − Ω1
)
, lR2 − Ω2
]
, (4.11)
implying
l∗1 = lfb1 ,
l∗2 = lR2 .
(4.12)
2. For α−λ1,L
α
lfb1 − Ω1 > p2p1
(
lR2 − Ω2
)
, the contract (b∗, β∗) satisfies
β∗ = αp1 −
(
(p1λ2,H −α)lR2 −c
(
lR2
))
−
(
(p1λ2,H −α)l˜2−c(l˜2)
)
p1(l˜2−Ω2) , (4.13)
10 For example, if the endowment Ω1 exceeds the first-best loan volume, bank 1 could lend its excess
wealth to bank 2. To empirically assess the validity of this result, one would need to solve an endogeneity
problem. Observing a bank which operates as interbank lender although it is not financially constrained does
not need to be in contradiction with our results. The bank may be financially unconstrained because it lends
to other banks. Therefore, the counterfactual question whether the bank would be financially constrained if
it did not lend to other banks is to be answered.
11 Note that gains from trade exist for banks with other endowments, but the exposition would be more
complex. We attend to a more general discussion in Sect. 4.5.
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b∗ = l˜2 − Ω2, (4.14)
implying
l∗1 = l˜1,
l∗2 = l˜2,
(4.15)
with l˜1 ∈
]
α
α−λ1,L Ω1, l
fb
1
[
and l˜2 > lR2 being jointly determined by
α−λ1,L
α
l˜1 − Ω1 = p2p1
(
l˜2 − Ω2
)
− 1p1α
∫ l˜2
lR2
(
p2λ2,L − φ′2(l2)
)
dl2,
φ′1(l˜1) = p1
(
α − λ1,L
) p2λ2,L−φ′2(l˜2)
p2α−
(
p2λ2,L−φ′2(l˜2)
) .
(4.16)
Proof See “Appendix”. unionsq
According to the proposition, two cases are to be distinguished, which differ with
respect to the relative weight of two factors. One factor is the funding gap faced by
bank 1 if it plans to grant the first-best volume of business loans, i.e., α−λ1,L
α
lfb1 − Ω1.
The other factor is the maximum amount bank 1 can raise from investors if it diversifies
its portfolio with an interbank loan that is as costly for bank 2 as funds raised from
investors. This amount has two components. First, as interbank loans cost bank 2 the
same as funds from investors if α = p1β, each unit of interbank loans contributes to
close the funding gap of bank 1 by β−α
α
= p2p1 . Second, bank 2 needs no more than
lR2 −Ω2 from external sources to refinance its favored volume of business loans lR2 in
the risky mode. Hence, provided that the interbank loan costs the same as funds from
investors, lR2 − Ω2 is also the largest amount bank 2 is willing to accept from bank 1.
Together this means that the highest amount, which bank 1 can raise externally if the
interbank loan is to cost bank 2 as much as other external funds, is p2p1
(
lR2 − Ω2
)
.
The first case in Proposition 2 refers to situations in which the funding gap of
bank 1
(
α−λ1,L
α
lfb1 − Ω1
)
is small relative to what this bank can potentially raise by
diversifying its portfolio with an interbank loan that costs as much as funds from
investors
(
p2
p1
(
lR2 − Ω2
))
. In this case, bank 1 diversifies its portfolio such that the
first-best volume of business loans becomes financially feasible, while bank 2 acts just
like without an interbank market. It operates in the same mode and grants the same
loan volume lR2 because, from the perspective of bank 2, the interbank loan merely
crowds out funds from investors.
In the other case, bank 1 would still be financially constrained with an interbank loan
of lR2 −Ω2 and would therefore benefit from granting a larger loan to bank 2. However,
bank 2 is unwilling to accept more funds than necessary to refinance lR2 , unless it
receives compensation for granting otherwise inefficient business loans. Hence, bank 1
has to offer a contract with a lower repayment obligation β, making the interbank loan
cheaper for bank 2 than funds from investors. In that sense, diversification becomes
costly for bank 1 because expected returns on the interbank loan do not cover their own
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refinancing cost. Trading off this cost of diversification with its benefit, the optimum
for bank 1 is given by (4.16). The LHS of the first equation in (4.16) reflects the
funding gap of bank 1. According to the RHS, the compensation for bank 2 (second
term) reduces the amount by which bank 1 could close its funding gap with the help of
a costless interbank loan (first term). According to the second equation in (4.16), the
gains from granting one more unit of business loans (LHS) just offsets the marginal
cost of compensating bank 2 (RHS). To discuss further implications of the optimal
arrangement between bank 1 and bank 2, we now take a closer look at the determinants
of these costs.
4.3 Bank-specific characteristics and diversification costs
Our discussion of the determinants of diversification costs begins with the definition
of these costs as a function K2 of the loan volume l1.
Definition 2 For any given l1, let
K2 (l1) := max
{
0,
(
(p1λ2,H − α)lR2 − c
(
lR2
))
− ((p1λ2,H − α)l¯2 − c(l¯2))
}
(4.17)
with l¯2 being implicitly defined by
α−λ1,L
α
l1 − Ω1 − p2p1
(
l¯2 − Ω2
) + K2p1α = 0, (4.18)
and let
K ′2 (l1) := dK2(l1)dl1 = max
{
0, p1
(
α − λ1,L
) p2λ2,L−φ′2(l¯2)
p2α−(p2λ2,L−φ′2(l¯2))
}
, (4.19)
Financial endowments and credit risks of the interbank lender as well as the
interbank borrower are key determinants of the diversification costs. Regarding endow-
ments, a higher Ω1 eases the interbank lender’s own financial constraint, making it
less dependent on diversification as a means to mitigate its financial constraint. The
interbank loan is smaller and so is the compensation payable to the interbank borrower.
By contrast, diversification is more expensive for the interbank lender if Ω2 is higher
because the interbank borrower will require a higher compensation. The reason is that
the interbank borrower would need less external funds. To be still willing to accept an
interbank loan that makes the interbank lender’s portfolio sufficiently diversified, the
interbank borrower asks for a higher compensation.
As regards risk, we operationalize it by introducing a mean-preserving spread to a
bank’s loan earnings. Let Δn := λn,H −λn,L implying λn,L = E[λn,s]− (1 − pn)Δn
and λn,H = E[λn,s]+ pnΔn . By definition, a higher Δn increases the variance of loan
earnings without changing E[λn,s]. According to (4.9), a higher credit risk Δ1 comes
with a tighter financial constraint for the interbank lender. In order to have sufficient
funds for maintaining a volume l1 of business loans, the interbank borrower has to
be convinced to accept a larger interbank loan. As a larger interbank loan drives up
l¯2, the interbank borrower requires a higher compensation. Similarly, the interbank
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borrower’s total loan earnings in its good state are higher with a higher Δ2. Holding
everything else equal, this implies that the interbank borrower forgoes less in profits
by investing in a larger than efficient loan portfolio. Hence, the required compensation
can be smaller too.
The marginal costs of diversification K ′2(l1) are defined as the change in compen-
sation required if the interbank lender wants to marginally increase its business loans.
If they are strictly positive, the properties of the function c imply that it is optimal for
the interbank lender to remain financially constrained. Proposition 2 has shown that,
although an interbank lender could potentially escape its financial constraint entirely,
the interbank loan chosen by the interbank lender may be too small to achieve this. The
characteristics of diversification costs in equilibrium are summarized in the following
lemma.
Lemma 1 Let Ω1 ∈
[
Ω¯1,
α−λ1,L
α
lfb1
[
and Ω2 ∈
[
0, Ω¯2
[
.
1. For α−λ1,L
α
lfb1 − Ω1 ≤ p2p1
(
lR2 − Ω2
)
, and hence l∗1 ≥ lfb1 and l∗2 ≤ lR2 , we have
K2
(
l∗1
) = K ′2 (l∗1) = 0.
2. For α−λ1,L
α
lfb1 − Ω1 > p2p1
(
lR2 − Ω2
)
, and hence l∗1 < l
fb
1 and l∗2 > lR2 , we have
(a) K2
(
l∗1
)
> 0 and dK2(l
∗
1)
dΩ1 < 0,
dK2(l∗1)
dΩ2 > 0,
dK2(l∗1)
dΔ1 > 0 and
dK2(l∗1)
dΔ2 < 0;
(b) K ′2
(
l∗1
)
> 0 and dK
′
2(l
∗
1)
dΩ1 < 0,
dK ′2(l∗1)
dΩ2 > 0,
dK ′2(l∗1)
dΔ1 > 0 and
dK ′2(l∗1)
dΔ2 < 0.
Proof See “Appendix”. unionsq
The costs of diversification, and thus the bank-specific characteristics, have two
implications. The first refers to the volume of business loans a bank wishes to grant,
henceforth credit supply for short. Applying the general implicit function theorem to
(4.16) and taking Lemma 1 into account, we obtain the following results.
Corollary 1 If the interbank lender’s credit supply depends on its own financial endow-
ment Ω1 and credit risk Δ1, then
1. credit supply of the interbank lender is negatively correlated with the interbank
borrower’s endowment Ω2 and positively correlated with the interbank borrower’s
credit risk Δ2;
2. credit supply of the interbank borrower is negatively correlated with the interbank
lender’s endowment Ω1 and varies with the interbank lender’s credit risk Δ1, but
with an unclear sign.
Otherwise, the bank-specific characteristics of its interbank trading partner are irrel-
evant for a bank’s credit supply.
That lower internal funds and higher credit risk tend to tighten a bank’s own finan-
cial constraint is a rather standard result. In fact, the model has qualitatively similar
implications when we abstract from any interbank linkages (i.e., setting b = 0, see
Proposition 1). The novelty in our model is that bank-specific characteristics of the
interbank borrower also matter for the credit supply of the interbank lender. Both,
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a better endowment Ω2 and a lower credit risk Δ2 increase the marginal costs of
diversification, inducing a lower credit supply by the interbank lender. In addition,
bank-specific characteristics of the interbank lender also have an effect on the inter-
bank borrower’s credit supply. With a higher Ω1, an interbank lender relies less on
diversification to maintain its credit supply. In order to economize on diversification
costs, it reduces the interbank loan, leading to a lower credit supply by the interbank
borrower. A higher credit risk Δ1 has two effects. In order to maintain a specific vol-
ume of business loans, the interbank lender would have to lend more to the interbank
borrower. However, since the marginal costs of diversification are higher, the interbank
lender does not want to leave the loan volume unchanged but prefers to grant fewer
loans. The first effect increases credit supply by the interbank borrower, the second
effect decreases it.
The second implication of diversification costs refers to the substitutability of inter-
bank and nonbank wholesale funding.
Corollary 2 If the interbank lender’s credit supply does not depend on its own financial
endowment Ω1 and/or credit risk Δ1, interbank loans and funds provided by nonbanks
are perfect substitutes for the interbank borrower. Otherwise, they are not.
The reasons behind this corollary are the following. For K2
(
l∗1
) = 0, interbank
loans are as costly for the interbank lender as funds from investors. If the interbank
lender would reduce the volume of the interbank loan, the interbank borrower could
easily replace them at no additional costs with funds from investors. For K2
(
l∗1
)
> 0,
the interbank loan comes at a lower unit cost and crowds out funding from other
investors. Therefore, these two funding sources are not perfect substitutes for the
interbank borrower, as a marginal reduction in interbank lending would not be offset
by more funds from investors.
At times, a limited substitutability of funding sources causes worries among central
banks and regulators. A major concern during the world financial crisis was that a
freeze in interbank lending or the failure of a major interbank lender would cut off
some other banks entirely from their funding sources, triggering a further blow to the
banking sector and aggregate credit supply. We now turn to these issues.
4.4 Interbankmarkets and credit intermediation
The previous analysis suggests that to understand the role of interbank loans for credit
supply, it is key to consider them as complements on the aggregate level. This is
because the banking sector as a whole can raise more funds from nonbanks when
banks trade with each other. Such a more-money effect of transactions among banks
indicates that tensions in interbank markets have the potential to harm the real economy
even more seriously than it is commonly thought. In particular, as the following com-
parison of credit supply in economies with and without an interbank market reveals,
not only interbank borrowers but also interbank lenders supply less credit if interbank
transactions cannot take place.
Corollary 3 A breakdown of interbank markets will lead to a drop in the interbank
lender’s credit supply which
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1. is independent from bank-specific characteristics of the interbank borrower if the
interbank lender’s credit supply before the market breakdown does not depend on
its own financial endowment Ω1 and credit risk Δ1;
2. tends to be more pronounced for a lower financial endowment Ω2 or higher credit
risk Δ2 of the interbank borrower if the interbank lender’s credit supply depends
on its own financial endowment Ω1 and credit risk Δ1.
Credit supply of a potential interbank lender, i.e., bank 1, will be different in
economies with and without interbank markets. For example, if the interbank mar-
ket allows the bank to completely escape its financial constraint at no further costs,
i.e., K2
(
l∗1
) = 0, the bank will supply credit according to its first-best loan volume
lfb1 . In economies without interbank markets, however, this bank will face a binding
financial constraint and supply only lˆ1 = αα−λ1,L Ω1. The percentage drop in credit
supply will be 1 − α
α−λ1,L
Ω1
lfb1
, which depends on the aforementioned bank-specific
characteristics Ω1 and Δ1 of the interbank lender. The less an interbank lender can
refinance its optimal credit supply with internal funds, i.e., the smaller is Ω1/lfb1 ,
the more important are interbank markets for aggregate credit supply. In a similar
vein, interbank markets will boost aggregate credit supply the stronger, the higher the
credit risk for the interbank lender is. A higher Δ1 implies a lower λ1,L and thus a
tighter financial constraint for the bank if it cannot ease its funding constraint through
diversification.12
The more interesting insight, however, refers to the role of the interbank borrower’s
characteristics. Corollary 1, Part 1 suggests that, if K2(l∗1 ) > 0, credit supply of the
interbank lender depends negatively on the borrower’s endowment Ω2 and positively
on its credit risk Δ2. Accordingly, the effect of a market breakdown on the interbank
lender’s credit supply depends on these characteristics too.
Finally, the interbank borrower’s credit supply may also depend on whether there
is an interbank market.
Corollary 4 A breakdown of interbank markets
1. has no impact on the interbank borrower’s credit supply if the interbank lender’s
credit supply does not depend on its own financial endowment Ω1 and/or credit
risk Δ1;
2. leads to a drop in the interbank borrower’s credit supply if the interbank lender’s
credit supply depends on its own financial endowment Ω1 and credit risk Δ1. This
drop is more pronounced if the financial endowment of the interbank lender Ω1 is
low.
According to Proposition 1, a potential borrower on interbank markets, i.e., bank 2,
may face a substantial external funding constraint in economies without an interbank
market. From Proposition 2, we know that there are two cases. One refers to situations
in which the interbank borrower wants to raise more externally than what the interbank
lender, i.e., bank 1, needs for achieving a degree of diversification that would allow
12 The existence of a functioning interbank market has qualitatively the same effect on bank 1’s credit
supply if diversification is costly.
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to refinance its first-best loan volume. Interbank loans and funds from investors are
perfect substitutes, and the interbank borrower’s credit supply does not depend on
whether or not there is an interbank market. Accordingly, an exogenous freeze of
interbank markets would not have an effect on this bank’s ability to grant business
loans.
In the other case, the interbank lender wants to lend more to the interbank borrower.
The interbank borrower is funded entirely by the other bank, and interbank loans are
not a perfect substitute for funds from investors. A freeze of the interbank market
implies that the interbank borrower’s credit supply will be lower. Instead of l˜2, as
given in (4.16), the credit supply will be only lR2 . The reason that this bank’s credit
supply is higher in an economy with an interbank market is not that it is dependent
on interbank borrowing, but that its business loans provide additional benefits to other
banks which are internalized only through interbank transactions.
4.5 Debt overhang and business loans with negative NPV
Next, we remove the restrictions on bank 2’s internal funds and let Ω2 ≶ 0. We also
ease the restriction on loan returns and assume merely α < λ2,H . In the absence of
interbank lending, i.e., b = 0, bank 2 would still operate as described in Proposition 1,
but with two qualifications. First, if Ω2 < 0, the bank would start with a negative
endowment which could be the result of a debt overhang. If the debt overhang problem
is bad enough such that Ω2 < − 1α
(
φ2
(
lR2
)
− p2λ2,LlR2
)
, bank 2 is better off closing
down right at the beginning of the period as expected profits would not cover the
existing debt overhang. Second, if α > p1λ2,H , the bank will not operate in the risky
mode because expected loan earnings may not even cover their cost of finance. If
bank 2’s endowment is positive, it will opt for the safe mode in the absence of interbank
markets and credit supply will be lmax2 := αΩ2/
(
α − λ2,L
)
. If its endowment is
negative, the best it can do is to fail outright.
The major difference to the previously considered cases is that the costs of diver-
sification comprise not only an element that depends on the deviation of the induced
loan volume l˜2 from the loan volume lR2 the bank would grant in the risky mode. It
also contains a lump sum. If bank 1 wants to take advantage of potential diversification
benefits through interbank loans, it has to make bank 2 operate in the risky mode in
the first place. Doing so requires a compensation C2 for bank 2 to not go bankrupt or
operate in the safe mode, if either would be preferred by bank 2 over the risky mode,
i.e.,
C2 := max
{
−
(
φ2
(
lR2
)
− p2λ2,LlR2 + αΩ2
)
,(
φ2
(
lS2
)
−
(
φ2
(
lR2
)
− p2λ2,LlR2
))
, 0
}
, (4.20)
with lS2 := min
{
lfb2 , max
{
0, lmax2
}}
. Hence, the total costs of diversification are
C2 + K2(l1) with
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K2(l1) := max
{
0,
(
(p1λ2,H − α)lR2 − c
(
lR2
))
− ((p1λ2,H − α)l¯2 − c(l¯2))
}
,
(4.21)
and l¯2 satisfying
α−λ1,L
α
l1 − Ω1 − p2p1
(
l¯2 − Ω2
) + C2+K2(l1)p1α = 0. (4.22)
It follows that, although the cost of diversification can be higher, it does not neces-
sarily render interbank loans meaningless as an instrument to relax funding constraints
for the interbank lender. Even structurally weak banks with a debt overhang and lend-
ing opportunities with negative NPV may still offer a diversification benefit to an
interbank lender which can outweigh its cost. Since the weak bank would not grant
any loans in the absence of interbank markets, a loan from another bank would thus
appear to be the only, life-sustaining funding source for this bank. Such a loan has to be
less costly than any other funding alternative as the interbank lender has to compensate
the interbank borrower for not going bankrupt. However, interbank loans will not be
cheap enough to allow the interbank borrower to regain sufficient financial strength
and a sound capital structure, for otherwise the interbank borrower would not offer
any diversification benefits to the interbank lender.
4.6 Diversified loan portfolios versus diversification through interbank lending
We conclude this section with a remark on the endogenous choice between investing
in a diversified portfolio of business loans and seeking diversification on the interbank
loan market. As discussed in Sect. 2, there is evidence for regional fragmentation in
European retail banking markets (European Central Bank 2018), which is considered
to be linked to local information advantages of banks.
Our model helps to shed some further light on this phenomenon. Suppose that
bank 1 can choose between two loan portfolios, A and B. There are again two states.
In one state, both portfolios are a success, and in the other state, they are both a failure.
However, compared to portfolio A, portfolio B is associated with higher marginal costs,
c′, lower expected returns, E[λ1,s], and a lower variance, Δ1. One could interpret
portfolio A as a portfolio solely consisting of business loans granted in the bank’s
home country and portfolio B as a portfolio of loans the bank grants at home as
well as abroad. The differences between portfolios then reflect both the informational
disadvantage the bank has abroad and the higher degree of diversification achievable
through direct cross-border lending. Importantly, these characteristics of the portfolios
imply that the financial constraint for the bank is tighter if it invests only in domestic
loans. This is not only because the lower costs and the higher expected return imply
a higher first-best loan volume, but also due to the higher volatility which lowers the
bank’s ability to repay investors regardless of whether the portfolio returns are high
or low. Provided the bank wants to operate in the safe mode, this financial constraint
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may be so tight that the bank prefers the more diversified portfolio B over the more
productive portfolio A.13
However, instead of seeking diversification through direct cross-border lending, the
bank can also choose to invest in loan portfolio A and lend to another bank which has
a better expertise in the foreign market. Then, the benefit of interbank lending is given
by the additional expected profit due to a looser financial constraint, net of any diver-
sification costs payable to the interbank borrower. If this benefit is sufficiently high,
the bank prefers diversification through interbank markets over direct diversification
of its loan portfolio.
5 Imperfect correlation of loan portfolios
So far, we analyzed interbank loans as an instrument for a bank to reduce its probability
of default provided that perfect diversification is possible, even though it may choose
not to become perfectly diversified due to the associated costs. However, business loans
granted by banks may be exposed to systematic risks, for example due to business cycle
factors. In this section, we set out to explore two related questions. First, how does the
correlation of banks’ business loans affect the benefits and costs of interbank lending,
and hence the terms of interbank loans? Second, what are the stability implications
if an interbank lender has to choose between counterparties with access to different
borrower pools?
5.1 Modeling correlation
With the aim of controlling for changes in the correlation of loan portfolios for a given
risk–return structure of business loans, we generalize the space of possible states S in
the following way.
As the success of a bank’s loans can be described as a random variable that takes
the value L if loan earnings are low (failure) and the value H if they are high (success),
the success of both banks follows a bivariate two-point distribution with four possible
states S = {L L, L H , H L, H H}. Let pL L , pL H , pH L and pH H denote the respective
probabilities of these states so that we have
λ1,L L = λ1,L , λ1,L H = λ1,L , λ2,L L = λ2,L , λ2,L H = λ2,H ,
λ1,H L = λ1,H , λ1,H H = λ1,H , λ2,H L = λ2,L , λ2,H H = λ2,H .
Thus, {L L, L H} is the set of states in which loan earnings for bank 1 are low, while
{L L, H L} is the set of states in which loan earnings for bank 2 are low. As before, pn
denotes the unconditional probability that earnings of the loan portfolio of bank n are
low, i.e.,
p1 = pL L + pL H , p2 = pL L + pH L . (5.1)
13 The bank may also prefer to operate in the risky mode holding portfolio A over the safe mode with
portfolio B.
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Expected loan earnings of bank n are E
[
λn,s
] = pnλn,L+(1 − pn) λn,H with variance
varn = pn (1 − pn)
(
λn,H − λn,L
)2
. The covariance of the banks’ loan earnings is
cov = (pL L pH H − pL H pH L)
(
λ1,H − λ1,L
) (
λ2,H − λ2,L
)
with a correlation coef-
ficient ρ = cov/√var1var2.
In order to isolate the implications of the correlation of loan portfolios, we start off
from unconditional probabilities of failure, p1 and p2, for which p1 = 1 − p2, and
consider changes to ρ that do not affect p1 and p2. The probabilities of states hence
read
pL L = p1(1 − p1)(1 + ρ),
pL H = p1 − p1(1 − p1)(1 + ρ),
pH L = (1 − p1) − p1(1 − p1)(1 + ρ),
pH H = p1(1 − p1)(1 + ρ),
(5.2)
implying that changes in the correlation of loan portfolios leave the risk-return profile
of each bank’s business loans unchanged. As nonnegativity of pL H and pH L implies an
upper bound on the correlation coefficient, given by min{p1/(1− p1), (1− p1/p1)} ∈
]0, 1], we cover all negative correlation coefficients as well as a range of positive
coefficients although not necessarily very large ones.14
Note that pL L can serve as an indicator of the degree of correlation of loan portfolios.
Obviously, pL L = 0 indicates perfect negative correlation while an increase in pL L
indicates that the correlation of portfolios increases.
5.2 Correlation and the terms of interbank loans
To understand the role of correlation for the terms of interbank loans, we need to adjust
the definition of a bank’s mode of operation.
Definition 3 Let Qn be the set of states in which bank n is bankrupt. Bank n operates
in a failure mode mn :=F if Qn = S, in a safe mode mn :=S if Qn = ∅, and in a risky
mode mn :=R (Qn) otherwise.
We conclude:
Lemma 2 For ρ > −1 and thus pL L > 0, interbank loans imply Q1={L L} and
Q2={L L, H L}.
Proof See “Appendix”. unionsq
Naturally, there is no scope for interbank loans as a means to ease a financial
constraint if the correlation coefficient is ρ = 1. For ρ ∈]− 1, 1[, interbank loans will
be made only if the interbank borrower operates in the risky mode, just like for ρ = −1.
However, if there is interbank lending, the interbank lender necessarily assumes also
some risk of bankruptcy for ρ ∈] − 1, 1[. The lender will be bankrupt in state L L , in
which earnings of its own business loans are low and the interbank borrower defaults.
Given that Q1 = {L L}, bank 1’s budget constraint together with the upper bound
on funds from investors implies a funding constraint similar to (4.9). This constraint
14 For details see “Appendix”.
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is now given by
Ω1 ≥ α−(1−pL L )λ1,Lα l1 − (1−pL L )β−αα b + α pL La1. (5.3)
Bankruptcy of bank 1 in state L L implies that investors will insist on a higher
repayment promise α/(1 − pL L) > α. This has two immediate consequences. First,
the funding liquidity of the bank’s business loans will be smaller as can be seen by
comparing the first terms on the RHS in (4.9) and (5.3). Second, bank 1 can ease its
financial constraint by lending to bank 2 only if β > α/(1 − pL L), see the second
term on the RHS of (5.3).
How business loans are correlated does not affect the banks’ optimal portfolio
choice in the absence of interbank lending. Hence, Proposition 1 still applies, i.e.,
provided their endowments satisfy Ω1 ∈ [Ω¯1, α−λ1,Lα lfb1 [ and Ω2 ∈ [0, Ω¯2[, bank 1
would operate in the safe mode without interbank lending and bank 2 in the risky
mode. However, with interbank loans, correlation has an effect on bank 1’s funding
constraint. Taking this into account, the interbank loan contract has the following
properties.
Proposition 3 Suppose Ω1 ∈ [Ω¯1, α−λ1,Lα lfb1 [ and Ω2 ∈ [0, Ω¯2[ and recall that pL L =
0 for ρ = −1 and d pL L/dρ > 0. Provided bank 1 grants an interbank loan to bank 2,
the interbank loan contract satisfies:
1. For α−(1−pL L )λ1,L
α
lR(Q1)1 − Ω1 ≤ p2−pL Lp1
(
lR(Q2)2 − Ω2
)
,
β∗ = αp1 , (5.4)
b∗ ∈
[
p1
p2−pL L
(
α−(1−pL L )λ1,L
α
lR(Q1)1 − Ω1
)
, lR(Q2)2 − Ω2
]
, (5.5)
implying
l∗1 = lR(Q1)1 , (5.6)
l∗2 = lR(Q2)2 , (5.7)
with lR(Q1)1 and l
R(Q2)
2 being defined by
φ′1
(
lR(Q1)1
)
= pL Lλ1,L , (5.8)
φ′2
(
lR(Q2)2
)
= p2λ2,L . (5.9)
2. For α−(1−pL L )λ1,L
α
lR(Q1)1 − Ω1 > p2−pL Lp1
(
lR(Q2)2 − Ω2
)
,
β∗ = αp1 −
(
(p1λ2,H −α)lR (Q2)2 −c
(
lR (Q2)2
))
−
(
(p1λ2,H −α)lˇ2−c(lˇ2)
)
p1(lˇ2−Ω2) , (5.10)
b∗ = lˇ2 − Ω2, (5.11)
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implying
l∗1 = lˇ1, (5.12)
l∗2 = lˇ2, (5.13)
with lˇ1 ∈
]
αΩ1
α−(1−pL L )λ1,L , l
R(Q1)
1
[
and lˇ2 > lR(Q2)2 being jointly determined by
α−(1−pL L )λ1,L
α
lˇ1 − Ω1 = p2−pL Lp1
(
lˇ2−Ω2
)
− 1−pL Lp1α
∫ lˇ2
lR (Q2)2
(
p2λ2,L−φ′2(l2)
)
dl2
(5.14)
and
φ′1(lˇ1) − pL Lλ1,L =
p1
(
α − (1 − pL L) λ1,L
) (
p2λ2,L − φ′2(lˇ2)
)
(p2 − pL L) α − (1 − pL L)
(
p2λ2,L − φ′2(lˇ2)
) . (5.15)
Proof The proof follows the proof for Proposition 2. unionsq
Provided bank 1 grants a loan to bank 2, there are again two cases to distinguish. The
first is when the interbank lender’s own funding gap is small. As the lender fails if both
banks’ loan earnings are low, this funding gap now refers to the volume of business
loans lR(Q1)1 that is optimal conditional on its failure in state L L . This volume is equal
to the first-best only for pL L = 0 and thus ρ = −1, lower than the first-best for all
pL L > 0 (ρ > −1) and decreasing in the degree of correlation. This is because an
increase in correlation will increase the probability of bank 1 to fail and therefore
lower the profitability of its business loans. The first part of Proposition 3 also shows
that the interbank rate, or repayment obligation of bank 2, does not depend on the
correlation of banks’ loan portfolios and that the interbank loan can be as large as with
perfect diversification. The reason is that correlation does not affect bank 2’s behavior
when there are no interbank links. Accordingly, it will also not affect the terms of an
interbank loan acceptable to bank 2. To conclude, in case of the interbank lender facing
a small funding gap, its volume of business loans is lower if correlation is higher while
the volume of business loans granted by the interbank borrower will be the same as in
the case of perfect diversification.
If the funding gap of the interbank lender is large, the second case in Proposition 3
applies. In this case, the volume lˇ2 of business loans made by the interbank borrower
depends on the volume of the interbank loan, which in turn depends on the volume lˇ1
of business loans the interbank lender wishes to make. Applying the general implicit
function theorem to Eqs. (5.14) and (5.15), we find that dlˇ1/dρ < 0 while the sign of
dlˇ2/dρ is not clear.15 To understand this, consider Eq. (5.15). Clearly, higher correla-
tion lowers the marginal returns (on the LHS) for a given volume of business loans lˇ1 as
15 See “Appendix”.
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the interbank lender’s probability of default (and thus of not collecting loan earnings)
increases. In addition, an increase in correlation results in an increase of the marginal
cost (on the RHS) of business loans lˇ1. The budget constraint (5.3) suggests that this is
for two reasons. First, maintaining the same loan volume lˇ1 implies a tighter funding
constraint for the interbank lender. To ease the additional pressure, a larger interbank
loan is needed so that the interbank borrower would have to grant more business loans,
for which marginal costs are higher. Second, a larger degree of correlation will impair
the effectiveness of interbank loans as a means to ease the lender’s funding constraint,
due to a rise in the minimum repayment promise β. Again, this implies that the inter-
bank lender needs to increase the volume of the interbank loan to maintain a certain
volume of business loans. Hence, the interbank lender will respond to an increase in
correlation by reducing its business loans until marginal returns and costs of these
loans are balanced. Whether this reduction in the lender’s business loans results in an
increase or decrease in the volume of interbank loans and the interbank borrower’s
business loans then depends on the extent to which the lender cuts its provision of
business loans.
While we cannot specify how the terms of the interbank loan depend on the correla-
tion of loan portfolios in general as the sign of dlˇ2/dρ is not clear, we can pinpoint these
terms for correlation coefficients for which interbank loans are (almost) meaningless
in terms of relaxing the interbank lender’s financial constraint.
Corollary 5 Suppose p1 ≥ 0.5. Provided interbank lending takes place, the terms
of interbank loans converge to b = lR(Q2)2 − Ω2 and β = α/p1, respectively, if ρ
converges to (1 − p1)/p1.
To understand this result, recall that bank 2 will under no circumstance accept an
interbank loan with a repayment obligation β above α/ (1 − p2) = α/p1 as such
a loan would be more expensive for bank 2 than funds from investors. Also, recall
from the funding constraint (5.3) that an interbank loan helps to mitigate the interbank
lender’s financial constraint only if (1 − pL L)β > α. Combining these bounds on β
implies that an interbank loan cannot improve the lender’s ability to make business
loans unless 1 − pL L > p1. If ρ converges to (1 − p1)/p1, the difference 1 − pL L
will converge to p1. Consequently, it makes less and less sense to bank 1 to offer an
interbank loan with a repayment obligation β below α/p1, which would be needed
to compensate bank 2 whenever it was supposed make business loans in excess of
lR(Q2)2 . Accordingly, for ρ → (1 − p1)/p1, bank 2’s volume of business loans will
be equal to or only marginally higher than lR(Q2)2 and the interbank loan will stipulate
that the amount loaned is equal to or only marginally higher than lR(Q2)2 − Ω2 and
that the interbank rate β is equal to or only marginally below α/p1.
Given the changes in the terms of interbank loans, we also draw the following
conclusion.
Corollary 6 There is a ρ¯ < 1 such that interbank lending breaks down if the coefficient
of correlation between banks’ business loans is larger than ρ¯.
The reason behind this finding is as follows. Bank 2 makes the same expected
profit with and without interbank loans. Therefore, whether or not there is an active
123
D. Dietrich, A. Hauck
market for interbank loans depends on the profits bank 1 expects. Without interbank
lending, these profits are determined by Proposition 1, and with interbank lending they
follow from Proposition 3. Two cases are to be distinguished. The first is if p1 ≥ 0.5.
As argued above, the RHS in Eq. (5.14) is arbitrarily close to zero if ρ is close to
(1 − p1)/p1, which implies that α−p1λ1,Lα lˇ1 ≈ Ω1 and thus αΩ1/(α − λ1,L) > lˇ1.
Hence, the volume of business loans bank 1 would grant without interbank loan is larger
than with interbank loan. Interbank lending therefore implies that bank 1 faces a tighter
funding constraint and cannot realize loan earnings in state L L . Bank 1 is thus strictly
better off without granting a loan to bank 2. The second case is if p1 < 0.5. The LHS
in Eq. (5.15) converges to φ′1(lˇ1)− p1λ1,L if ρ converges to p1/(1− p1). Given that the
RHS in Eq. (5.15) is positive, the volume of business loans with an interbank loan, lˇ1,
is smaller than the respective volume if bank 1 would operate in a risky mode without
granting any interbank loans, lRn . Yet, bank 1’s probability of survival is (almost) the
same because pL H is arbitrarily close to zero. However, given that the safe mode is
already better for bank 1 than the risky mode without interbank loans, interbank lending
only makes bank 1 worse off. To conclude, since granting an interbank loan is always
more profitable than not granting such loans provided the correlation coefficient is
ρ = −1, and since granting no interbank loans makes bank 1 better off if ρ is close to
(1− p1)/p1 for p1 ≥ 0.5 and close to p1/(1− p1) for p1 < 0.5, there is a critical value
of the correlation coefficient ρ¯∈] − 1, min{p1/(1 − p1), (1 − p1)/p1}[ such that it is
not profitable to make an interbank loan for ρ > ρ¯.
5.3 Stability implications
Suppose a bank can choose to lend either to a bank that would allow for perfect diver-
sification, or to a bank that would expose the interbank lender to the risk that the failure
of the counterparty can trigger its own failure. In both cases, the possibility that the
counterparty fails to repay its interbank loan is what makes interbank lending prof-
itable in the first place. However, why and under which circumstances is it profitable
for the interbank lender to expose itself to the risk of its own bankruptcy?
To address this question, suppose there are three banks n ∈ {1, 2, 3}. As before, the
potential interbank lender is bank 1. This bank can lend either to bank 2 or to bank 3,
but not to both. Business loans of bank 2 are a success if and only if those by bank 1
are a failure. Business loans of bank 3 are imperfectly correlated with those granted
by bank 1. Following the spirit of the previous notation, the relevant states are now
S = {L H L, L H H , H L L, H L H} with probabilities of states as in Eq. (5.2), i.e.,
pL H L = p1(1 − p1)(1 + ρ),
pL H H = p1 − p1(1 − p1)(1 + ρ),
pH L L = (1 − p1) − p1(1 − p1)(1 + ρ),
pH L H = p1(1 − p1)(1 + ρ).
Accordingly, {L H L, L H H} is the set of states in which loan earnings for bank 1 are
low, {H L L, H L H} is the set of states in which loan earnings for bank 2 are low and
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{L H L, H L L} is the respective set of states for bank 3. As before, pn denotes the
unconditional probability of low loan earnings of bank n, with p1 = 1− p2 = 1− p3.
For all banks, loan earnings satisfy assumption (3.2).
The only interesting case is where the coefficient of correlation is sufficiently small
such that granting a loan to bank 3 is better than granting no interbank loan at all, i.e.,
ρ ∈]−1, ρ¯[. According to Proposition 1, bank 1 operates in the safe mode and banks 2
and 3 operate in the risky mode in the absence of interbank lending if endowments
satisfy Ω1 ∈
[
Ω¯1, (α − λ1,L)lfb1 /α
[
and Ω2 ∈
[
0, Ω¯2
[
and Ω3 ∈
[
0, Ω¯3
[
.
Lemma 3 Let Pk be the probability of at least k banks failing at the same time. For
Ω1 ∈
[
Ω¯1,
α−λ1,L
α
lfb1
)
, Ω2 ∈
[
0, Ω¯2
)
and Ω3 ∈
[
0, Ω¯3
)
, we have
P1 = (1 − p1) + p1(1 − p1)(1 + ρ),
P2 =
{
(1 − p1) − p1(1 − p1)(1 + ρ) if bank 1 lends to bank 2,
(1 − p1) if bank 1 lends to bank 3,
P3 = 0.
Lemma 3 states that if bank 1 trades with bank 2, the probability of two banks
being simultaneously in default equals the probability of those states in which bank 2
and bank 3 jointly fail. The joint bank failure is just the result of a common shock
in the sense that both banks suffer low loan earnings in state H L L . If, however,
bank 1 is better off by lending funds to bank 3, there is a spillover effect from bank 3
to bank 1 in state L H L . Without interbank loans, bank 1 would have operated in
the safe mode and hence would survive in this state. By granting a loan to bank 3,
however, bank 1 will not survive in this state according to Lemma 2. It has exposed
itself to the risk that its counterparty will not repay in a state in which earnings will be
already low anyway. The interbank lender has chosen to add interbank loans to its loan
portfolio, although they are to some extent subject to the same shock as its own business
loans.
The question about whether and under which conditions the interbank lender prefers
bank 3 over bank 2 can be answered by looking at the respective costs of diversifica-
tion, K2(l1) and K3(l1), associated with interbank loans to bank 2 and 3, respectively.
Costs K2(l1) have been defined in Definition 2. According to Definition 3, the set
of states in which bank 2 is bankrupt Q2 = {(1, 0, 0), (1, 0, 1)} and for bank 3
the respective set is Q3 = {(0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0)}. Costs K3(l1) can thus be defined as
follows.
Definition 4 Let
K3(l1) := max
{
0,
((
E[λ3,s] − (1 − p1)λ3,L − α
)
lR(Q3)3 − c
(
lR(Q3)3
))
− ((E[λ3,s] − (1 − p1)λ3,L − α) l¯3 − c(l¯3))
} (5.16)
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and
K ′3(l1) :=
dK3(l1)
dl1
= max
{
0, p1 (
(1−p1)λ3,L−φ′3(l¯3))(α−(1−p1(1−p1)(1+ρ))λ1,L)
α(1−p1)(1−p1(1+ρ))−(1−p1(1−p1)(1+ρ))((1−p1)λ3,L−φ′3(l¯3))
}
(5.17)
with l¯3 being implicitly defined by
p1
(1−p1)(1−p1(1+ρ))
(
α−(1−p1(1−p1)(1+ρ))λ1,L
α
l1−Ω1
)
− (l3−Ω3)− 1−p1(1−p1)(1+ρ)α((1−p1)−p1(1−p1)(1+ρ)) K3(l1) = 0.
(5.18)
Diversification costs K3(l1) have qualitatively similar properties as K2(l1) with
respect to bank 3’s endowment Ω3 and credit risk Δ3. Bank 1 makes its decision about
with whom to trade on interbank markets by comparing expected profits. Expected
profits of bank 1 from trading with bank 2 are
(
E[λ1,s] − α
)
l˜1 − c(l˜1) − K2(l˜1) (5.19)
and expected profits associated with lending to bank 3 are
(
E[λ1,s] − α
)
lˇ1 − c(lˇ1) − p1(1 − p1)(1 + ρ)λ1,L lˇ1 − K3(lˇ1). (5.20)
When comparing expected profits, Proposition 2 implies that bank 1 prefers lending
to bank 2 over holding no interbank claims at all if Ω1 ∈
[
Ω¯1, (α − λ1,L)lfb1 /α
[
. This
is because it would operate in the safe mode regardless, but some b∗ > 0, and not
b = 0, actually maximizes expected profits. Another implication is that transactions
with bank 2 will allow bank 1 to refinance the first-best loan volume lfb1 already at no
cost, i.e., K2(l˜1) = 0, if (α − λ1,L)lfb1 /α − Ω1 ≤
(
lR2 − Ω2
)
(1 − p1)/p1. Trading
with bank 3, however, would in any case at least imply to forfeit loan earnings in state
H L L . Therefore, bank 2 will be the preferred transaction partner if K2(l˜1) = 0.
Given that expected profits for the interbank lender are strictly decreasing in Ωn
and increasing in Δn for n ∈ {2, 3}, we come to the following conclusion.
Corollary 7 An interbank lender is more likely to lend to bank 3, and the probability
of more banks going bankrupt at the same time tends to be higher, the larger are Ω2
and Δ3 and the smaller are Ω3 and Δ2.
To sum up, the answer to the question of which bank is the better alternative for bank
1 to trade with depends inter alia on bank-specific factors of the potential interbank
borrowers. A larger endowment of a counterparty implies that the costs of diversifica-
tion for the interbank lender are higher. By contrast, a larger risk makes a counterparty
more attractive as it offers diversification at lower costs. The interbank lender shies
away from perfect diversification if the funding gap of the interbank borrower, who
operates in the risky mode and offers scope for perfect diversification, is relatively
small.
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6 Theory and evidence
While a full-fledged empirical test of our theory is beyond the scope of this paper,
our framework matches a number of stylized facts about Europe’s interbank markets,
and the mechanism we have described generates several empirical predictions that are
consistent with recent empirical findings.
One stylized fact is that the size of interbank claims can be substantially larger
than the average deposit and credit fluctuations of banks. For example, since 2002,
the yearly average sum of interbank assets and liabilities in Germany has persistently
exceeded the average fluctuations of deposits and credit (measured by the yearly
standard deviation) by a factor of five to ten (Bluhm et al. 2016, Figure 1). This
observation is economically significant for the Euro area as the German interbank
market is the largest segment of the European interbank market where, according to
Bluhm et al. (2016, Figure 4), total interbank lending exceeded 40% of total bank
assets before the financial crisis and 30% afterward.16
Another stylized fact refers to the maturity and risk structure of interbank transac-
tions. According to Alves et al. (2013, Table 3), long-term (at least 1 year) interbank
exposures of a median bank in 2011 accounted for more than half of total exposures
for a sample of 53 large banks in the Euro area. In Germany, more than one-third
of banks’ domestic interbank liabilities between 2002 and 2014 had a maturity of
more than 1 year and the average maturity of interbank claims is well above 1 year
(Bluhm et al. 2016, Figure 7). In terms of cross-border interbank loans, data from the
Bank for International Settlement suggest that the average maturity of loans granted
between 1997 and 2012 is close to 3 years.17 The recent increase in the importance
of long-term transactions among banks has sometimes been attributed to regulatory
changes. The argument is that regulations such as the liquidity coverage ratio and the
net stable funding ratio push banks to long-term maturities in the market for wholesale
funding. But this argument is incomplete. If a bank wants to grant long-term loans
and, because of the regulation, approaches another bank for a loan with a matching
maturity, the problem of having to find long-term funding will not disappear. Instead,
it will only shift from the interbank borrower to the lender, which will now have to find
long-term funding to cover its additional long-term interbank loan. Accordingly, the
interbank lender will agree to the transaction only if it can realize another benefit that
is unavailable to the borrower. The diversification argument developed in our paper
can explain such benefit.
As regards risks, Neal and García-Iglesias (2013, Table 1) report for the five largest
economies in Europe (France, Germany, Italy, UK and Spain) that in 2011, the share
of unsecured interbank liabilities in total liabilities ranged from 6.4 to 11.3%. In the
UK, unsecured lending among banks accounts for more than a quarter of risk entailed
in the interbank network, both in terms of credit risk and funding risk. Moreover,
about one-third of unsecured lending is with a maturity of more than three months
16 For the Euro area as a whole, the share is smaller but still substantial. Its pre- and post-crisis level was
above 20% and between 18 and 21%, respectively.
17 According to calculations by Hale et al. (2019, Fn. 14).
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(Langfield et al. 2014).18 In Italy, domestic credit exposures in the interbank market
have shifted away from short-term to longer-term transactions. For example, based on
consolidated data excluding intragroup lending, the figure for unsecured longer-term
transactions in 2012 was more than twice as large as that of short-term transactions,
whereas in 2008 the ratio was less than a quarter (Bargigli et al. 2015, Table 1).
A third stylized fact relates to the average net positions of interbank market par-
ticipants. Not only are they substantially different from zero, their sign is also quite
persistent over time (Ayadi et al. 2016; Martín-Oliver et al. 2017; Roengpitya et al.
2017). This suggests that there are banks which seldom switch from being inter-
bank borrowers to interbank lenders or vice versa, which is at odds with the notion
of interbank markets providing predominantly coinsurance of temporary idiosyncratic
liquidity risks. For coinsurance of liquidity risk to explain this pattern, it would require
that some banks are hit time and time again by a series of negative short-term liquid-
ity shocks, while others are in a same way struck repeatedly by a series of positive
short-term liquidity shocks. However, rather than referring to a series of bad luck or
good luck, one would instead point to a structurally funding position of banks. More-
over, Ayadi et al. (2016, Table 3.1) report for a large sample of banks in the European
Economic Area and Switzerland that compared to interbank borrowers, lending banks
have a higher tangible common equity-to-assets ratio. Similarly, Martín-Oliver et al.
(2017, Tables 3 and 5) find that Spanish interbank lenders tend to outperform borrow-
ers in terms of solvency and liquidity measures, while Angelini et al. (2011, Tables 1
and 2) show that in Italy interbank lenders tend to have a higher (risk-weighted) capital
ratio and a higher ratio of liquid assets to total assets than borrowers, especially during
a crisis when financial constraints on banks tighten.
Altogether, these stylized facts suggest that the framework developed in this paper
is appropriate to study interbank lending activities. Our framework also fits with the
notion that the characteristics of counterparties seem to matter for interbank transac-
tions (Afonso et al. 2011). The empirical literature indicates that banks rely heavily
on decentralized, bilateral over-the-counter transactions where transaction partners
know each other before entering a contract (Craig and von Peter 2014). However,
even for trades not carried out over the counter, counterparty characteristics are key
(Temizsoy et al. 2015). For example, an important alternative to OTCs is trading plat-
forms such as e-MID which make the identity of the counterparty public (Angelini
et al. 2011).19 Another view is that banks overcome informational asymmetries by
maintaining longer-term relationships (Bräuning and Fecht 2017). However, asym-
metric information about counterparty risk alone cannot easily explain why worse
performing banks increased the number of their counterparties right after the collapse
of Lehman in September 2008 as documented by Afonso et al. (2011) who suggest that
this could be the result of those banks seeking to diversify their exposure to interbank
borrowers. The mechanism we present in the present paper analyzes such a motive for
diversification and its implications.
18 In Figure 4, they report the maturity breakdown of the UK interbank market. According to Panel A, 20%
of unsecured lending by UK banks is with a maturity between 3 and 12 months, and another 14% with a
maturity of more than 1 year.
19 OTCs may become more important with the recent regulatory push toward centralized clearing (Bargigli
et al. 2015).
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As for the predictions of our model, the findings in Bluhm et al. (2016) are partic-
ularly interesting. They suggest that especially long-term transactions with nonbank
customers can explain observed changes in a bank’s interbank accounts as predicted
by our model. In Table 4, Bluhm et al. (2016) report that 1 percentage point more
long-term liabilities to nonbanks (relative to total assets) is associated with 0.39 per-
centage points more gross long-term interbank assets (relative to total assets), while
interbank liabilities are virtually unchanged. This finding fits with the results for our
interbank lender who channels additional funds from nonbanks only partly to other
banks and partly to finance other bank assets. In Table 5, Bluhm et al. (2016) report
that a larger supply of long-term loans to nonbanks by 1 percentage point (relative
to total assets) is associated with more gross long-term interbank liabilities by 0.84
percentage points (relative to total assets).20 This observation suggests, first, that it
matters for an interbank borrower how to fund loans to nonbanks and, second, that
interbank borrowing is, to a large extent, the preferred way of funding. This fits with
the results for an interbank borrower in our model to whom interbank loans and other
types of finance tend to be imperfect substitutes.
The evidence documented in Iyer et al. (2014) also confirms predictions of our
model. Focusing on the Portuguese banking sector, they investigate how the supply
of credit to nonbanks was affected by the interbank market freeze in August 2007.
Before the market freeze, Portuguese banks were consistently and persistently net bor-
rowers on interbank markets, being funded to large extents by foreign banks.21 Given
that cross-border lending to firms and households in the Euro area has been tradition-
ally low compared to cross-border interbank lending (European Central Bank 2018,
Chart 19), Portuguese banks may thus have provided foreign banks with an opportunity
to diversify their assets geographically. Against this background, our model predicts
that a freeze in the interbank market causes a drop in credit supply which is stronger
the more funds the interbank borrower has raised prior to the market freeze. Indeed,
Iyer et al. (2014, Table 2) report that firms obtaining loans from banks with a higher
interbank borrowing ratio before the freeze suffered from a sharper fall in credit supply
from these banks. Our model also predicts that the credit supply of interbank borrow-
ers to firms will respond more strongly to a freeze of the interbank market the larger
the (marginal) cost of diversification is. This (marginal) cost depends positively on the
ability of those banks to finance their loans with own funds (see Lemma 1). Accord-
ingly, we would expect that banks with lower capital will reduce their credit supply less
when interbank markets freeze (Corollary 4). This expectation is confirmed as banks
with higher capital ratios tended to reduce credit supply more strongly in response to
the market freeze in 2007 (Iyer et al. 2014, Table 7).
20 All figures reported here are significant at the 1% level.
21 Between 2006 and 2009, borrowing from (only 34) foreign banks actually accounted for 27% of total
bank assets (Iyer et al. 2014, Table 1).
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed an argument for transactions among banks that are
not deposits or repos. In a nutshell, if a bank lends to another bank, the interbank lender
assumes some counterparty risk. Taking on such risk can help to further diversify a
bank’s overall exposure to risk, and a better diversified portfolio improves the cost and
availability of external funding for a financially constrained bank. Then, interbank
trades have effects on aggregate credit supply and the stability of the banking sector.
These effects depend on the potential benefits of diversification as well as on its
associated, endogenous cost. The latter are a function of a multitude of bank-specific
characteristics of both, interbank lender and borrower.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
Combining (3.8) with (3.7) and either (4.1) and (4.2) or (4.3), we obtain a bank’s
expected profits in the safe mode, ΠSn , and in the risky mode ΠRn , respectively. In
reduced form, they read
ΠSn (ln, an) :=
(
E
[
λn,s
] − α) ln + αΩn − c (ln) , (A.1)
ΠRn (ln, an) :=
(
(1 − pn) λn,H − α
)
ln − pnαan + αΩn − c (ln) . (A.2)
Since ∂Π
S
n (ln ,aˆn)
∂ln ≤ 0 only if ln ≥ lfbn ,
∂ΠRn (ln ,0)
∂ln ≤ 0 only if ln ≥ lRn , and
ΠSn
(
ln, aˆn
) ≥ ΠRn (ln, 0) for all ln ≤ αΩnα−λn,L , expected profits Πn of bank n can
be written as a piecewise function
Πn (ln, an) =
{
ΠSn (ln, an) for ln ≤ lmaxn ,
ΠRn (ln, an) for ln > lmaxn ,
(A.3)
so that its optimization problem reads
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max
ln ,an
Πn (ln, an)
s.t.
ln ≥ 0,
an ≥ max {0,Ωn − ln} . (A.4)
The solution to this problem satisfies
lˆn =
{
min
{
αΩn
α−λn,L , l
fb
n
}
if ΠˆSn ≥ ΠˆRn ,
lRn if ΠˆSn < ΠˆRn .
(A.5)
Moreover, for ln > lmaxn , a bank sets an = 0 because then ∂Πn(ln ,an)∂an < 0. For ln < Ωn ,
a bank sets an = Ωn−ln > 0. And for ln ∈ [Ωn, lmaxn ], a bank is indifferent with regard
to holding the safe asset. Finally, since ∂Πˆ
S
n
∂Ωn
≥ α = ∂ΠˆRn
∂Ωn
, we obtain Proposition 1.
B Proof of Proposition 2
We start with a characterization of the banks’ optimization problems. Bank 2’s
expected profits in reduced form depend on exogenous parameters and on (b, β).
– If Ω2 + b ≤ lR2 , expected profits ΠR2 (l2, a2) are obtained from (3.8) taking into
account (3.1) and (3.7), which gives
ΠR2 (l2, a2) =
(
p1λ2,H − α
)
l2 − (1 − p1) αa2 + αΩ2 + (α − p1β) b − c (l2) ,
(B.1)
for which the optimization problem is
max
l2,a2
(
p1λ2,H − α
)
l2 − (1 − p1) αa2 + αΩ2 + (α − p1β) b − c (l2) .
s.t.
l2 ≥ 0,
a2 ≥ max {0,Ω2 + b − l2} . (B.2)
– If Ω2 + b > lR2 , we have φ′2 < p2λ2,2, i. e. the bank will not raise any additional
funds from investors, i. e. d2 = 0. The budget constraint (3.1) implies that the only
decision left is about allocating Ω2 + b across l2 and a2, and expected profits are
ΠR2 (l2, a2) = p1
(
λ2,H l2 + αa2 − βb
) − c (l2) (B.3)
and the optimization problem is
max
l2,a2
p1
(
λ2,H l2 + αa2 − βb
) − c (l2)
s.t.
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l2 + a2 = Ω2 + b.
l2 ≥ 0,
a2 ≥ 0. (B.4)
Let L2 be defined by φ′2 (L2) = p2 (λ2 − α). Then, the bank sets a2 = Ω2+b−L2
if Ω2 + b > L2 and a2 = 0 if lR2 < Ω2 + b ≤ L2.
Let
(
l˘2, a˘2
)
denote the solution to problems (B.2) and (B.4) and note that (i) if Ω2+b /∈(
lR2 , L2
]
then dl˘2db = 0 and else dl˘2db = 1, (ii) if Ω2 + b > L2 then da˘2db = 1 and else
da˘2
db = 0, and (iii) neither l˘2 nor a˘2 depend on β.
As regards bank 1, expected profits are again derived from (3.8) taking into account
(3.1) and (3.7)
ΠS1 (l1, a1) :=
(
E
[
λ1,s
] − α) l1 + αΩ1 + (p1β − α) b − c (l1) , (B.5)
so that its optimization problem is
max
l1, a1, b, β
ΠS1 (l1, a1) (B.6)
s.t .
l1 ≥ 0, (B.7)
a1 ≥ max {0,Ω1 − l1} , (B.8)
b ≥ 0, (B.9)
β ∈
[
α, αp1
]
, (B.10)
l1 ≤ αΩ2+(β−α)bα−λ1,L , (B.11)
ΠR2
(
l˘2, a˘2
)
≥ ΠR2
(
lR2 , 0
)
. (B.12)
Constraint (B.11) is to ensure that bank 1 operates within its financial means and
(B.12) that bank 2 is not better off by rejecting an interbank loan.
The proof is for each of the two cases made in the proposition separately.
Case 1 α−λ1,L
α
lfb1 − Ω1 ≤ p2p1
(
lR2 − Ω2
)
.
(a) Equation (4.11) implies that budget constraint (3.1) is met for bank 2 if l2 = lR2 .
As for bank 1, assume that it chooses the highest possible volume of interbank
loans according to (4.11), i.e., b∗ = lR2 − Ω2, for which (4.9) becomes
l1 ≤
αΩ1+
(
α
p1 −α
)(
lR2 −Ω2
)
(α−λ1,L ) . (B.13)
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Rearranging terms shows that RHS is at least lfb1 . For b∗ = p1p2
(
α−λ1,L
α
lfb1 − Ω1
)
,
RHS is equal to lfb1 . Hence, for any b∗ satisfying (4.11) bank 1 is not financially
constrained if l1 = lfb1 . Therefore, the solution (4.11) to (4.12) is feasible.
(b) With interbank loans according to (4.10) and (4.11), bank 2 can raise the same
amount of funds for the same total funding costs as in the absence of interbank trade.
Choosing the same portfolio thus generates the same expected profits. Moreover,
as any additional funds come at the same marginal costs, deviating from lR2 does
not increase profits.
(c) Bank 1 is not better off by asking for anyβ = αp1 . Ifβ > αp1 , bank 2 would reject the
contract. If β < αp1 , the expected returns on interbank loans would not cover their
financing costs. Moreover, the financial constraint of bank 1 would be tighter unless
bank 1 increases b. However, for any b ∈
(
p1
p2
(
α−λ1,L
α
lfb1 − Ω1
)
, lR2 − Ω2
)
bank 1 could marginally increase b anyway if needed even without incurring the
loss on interbank loans. Hence, β∗ = αp1 .
(d) The (b∗, β∗) implies for bank 1 that internal funds and external funds raised
by borrowing against claims on bank 2 can be as high as ω1 := Ω1 +(
1
p1 − 1
) (
lR2 − Ω2
)
which is independent from l1. Hence, replacing Ω1 with
ω1 and adapting the arguments made in Proposition 1 imply that bank 1, which
at the margin would no longer be financially constrained, cannot be better off by
deviating from lfb1 . Since lfb1 is optimal regardless of the degree of slack in (4.9), the
bank is indifferent between volumes of interbank loans as long as lfb1 is feasible.
To sum up, (a) and (b) show that the solution (4.10) to (4.12) is feasible, while (c)
and (d) prove that bank 1 cannot be made (strictly) better off by choosing any other
arrangement given that bank 2 is indifferent.
Case 2 α−λ1,L
α
lfb1 − Ω1 > p2p1
(
lR2 − Ω2
)
. For the time being, assume that l∗1 and
l∗2 —as defined by (4.15) and (4.16)—are optimal, implying b ≥ lR2 − Ω2.
(a) Equation (4.14) directly implies that the budget constraint of bank 2 is met if
d2 = 0. Furthermore, (4.14) and (4.16) imply that the budget constraint of bank 1
is met.
(b) With (4.13) and (4.14), bank 2 gets more funds than it would raise in the absence of
interbank trade. The associated increase in loans l˜2 − lR2 > 0 will cause expected
profits being lower by ((p1λ2,H − α)lR2 − c(lR)) − ((p1λ2,H − α)l˜2 − c(l˜2)). A
per unit reduction in the cost of funds of
(
(p1λ2,H −α)lR2 −c
(
lR
))−((p1λ2,H −α)l˜2−c(l˜2)
)
p1(l˜2−Ω2)
compensates bank 2 for this drop in profits. Hence, expected profits are the same
for bank 2 as for b = 0 and l = lR2 . Moreover, any additional funds come at the
same marginal costs as for b = 0. Hence, granting more loans than l˜2 by raising
additional funds from investors is not increasing profits. This follows from l˜2 > lR2
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and the FOC stated in Proposition 1. Similarly, granting fewer loans and investing
in the safe asset does not increase profits.
(c) For an arrangement to be optimal, it has to satisfy the FOC (4.16). The proof
is by contradiction. Assume it would be optimal to increase/decrease loans l1
by some ε. Given that bank 2 needs to be compensated according to (4.14), it
follows from the first equation in (4.16) that bank 2 would change its loans by
α−λ1,L
α p2
p1 −
1
p1
(
(p1λ2,H −α)−c′
(
l˜2
))ε. The associated change in compensation then is
(
p2λ2,L − φ′2
(
l˜2
))
α−λ1,L
α p2
p1 −
1
p1
(
(p1λ2,H −α)−c′
(
l˜2
))ε
while the change in profits for bank 1 due to changes in l1 would be φ′1(l˜1)ε.
Hence, if (4.16) holds, such changes do not increase expected profits. Note that
(4.16) implies b > lR2 − Ω2 because any marginal changes in l1 would otherwise
only affect the financial constraint of bank 1 without changing the costs of diver-
sification, for the compensation payable to bank 2 cannot be further lowered (it is
already nil).
To sum up, (a) and (b) show that the solution (4.13) to (4.16) is feasible, while (c)
shows that it is also maximizing expected profits for bank 1.
C Proof of Lemma 1
If α−λ1,L
α
lfb1 − Ω1 > p2p1
(
lR2 − Ω2
)
, then K2
(
l∗1
)
> 0. Moreover, condition (4.16)
then implies p2α −
(
p2λ2,L − φ′2
(
l∗2
))
> 0 and thus K ′2
(
l∗1
)
> 0. Write Eqs. (4.17)
and (4.18) as
E1 = α−λ1,Lα l1 − Ω1 − p2p1
(
l¯2 − Ω2
) + K2(l1)p1α = 0, (C.1)
E2 = K2(l1) +
(
(p1λ2,H − α)l¯2 − c(l¯2)
) − ((p1λ2,H − α)lR2 − c
(
lR2
))
= 0.
(C.2)
According to the general implicit function theorem, we obtain
dK2(l1)
dX =
∂E1
∂ l¯2
∂E2
∂X −
∂E2
∂ l¯2
∂E1
∂X
∂E1
∂K2(l1)
∂E2
∂ l¯2
− ∂E1
∂ l¯2
∂E2
∂K2(l1)
, (C.3)
dl¯2
dX =
∂E2
∂K2(l1)
∂E1
∂X −
∂E1
∂K2(l1)
∂E2
∂X
∂E1
∂K2(l1)
∂E2
∂ l¯2
− ∂E1
∂ l¯2
∂E2
∂K2(l1)
, (C.4)
with X ∈ {Ω1,Ω2,Δ1,Δ2}, i.e.,
dK2(l1)
dΩ1 = −
p2λ2,L−φ′2(l¯2)
p2α−(p2λ2,L−φ′2(l¯2))
p1α < 0,
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dK2(l1)
dΩ2 =
p2λ2,L−φ′2(l¯2)
p2α−(p2λ2,L−φ′2(l¯2))
p2α > 0,
dK2(l1)
dΔ1 =
p2λ2,L−φ′2(l¯2)
p2α−(p2λ2,L−φ′2(l¯2))
p1 p2l1 > 0,
dK2(l1)
dΔ2 = −
(
l¯2−lR2
)
p2α−(p2λ2,L−φ′2(l¯2))
p1 p22α < 0,
and further by Young’s Theorem
dK ′2(l1)
dΩ1 = −
(α−λ1,L)c′′(l¯2)
(p2α−(p2λ2,L−φ′2(l¯2)))3
p21 p2α
2 < 0,
dK ′2(l1)
dΩ2 =
(α−λ1,L)c′′(l¯2)
(p2α−(p2λ2,L−φ′2(l¯2)))3
p1 p22α
2 > 0,
dK ′2(l1)
dΔ1 =
p2λ2,L−φ′2(l¯2)
p2α−(p2λ2,L−φ′2(l¯2))
p1 p2 + (α−λ1,L)c
′′(l2)
(p2α−(p2λ2,L−φ′2(l¯2)))3
p21 p
2
2αl˜1 > 0,
dK ′2(l1)
dΔ2 = −
(α−λ1,L)
(p2α−(p2λ2,L−φ′2(l¯2)))2
p21 p
2
2α − (α−λ1,L)(l¯2−l
R
2 )c
′′(l¯2)
(p2α−(p2λ2,L−φ′2(l¯2)))3
p21 p
2
2α.
D Probability distribution with imperfect correlation
From varn = pn (1 − pn)
(
λn,H − λn,L
)2
, cov = (pL L pH H − pL H pH L)(λ1,H −
λ1,L)(λ2,H − λ2,L) and p1 = 1 − p2, it follows that
ρ = pL L pH H −pL H pH Lp1(1−p1) , (D.1)
while p1 = 1 − p2 and (5.1) imply
pH H = pL L ,
pL H = p1 − pL L ,
pH L = (1 − p1) − pL L .
(D.2)
Combining (D.1) with (D.2) then results in (5.2).
E Proof of Lemma 2
If Q2 = ∅, interbank loans would be safe and bank 2 would accept any b > 0 only
if β ≤ α. Hence, from bank 1’s perspective, they would be weakly dominated by the
safe asset. For interbank loans to offer any potential benefits to bank 1, it must be that
β > α, which in turn requires {L L, H L} ⊂ Q2. However, as repayments are the same
in states L H and H H , it follows {L H , H H} /∈ Q2 because otherwise bank 2 would
never repay any interbank loan. Hence, Q2 = {L L, H L}.
Bank 1’s loan earnings are low in states L H and L L . In state L H , bank 1 has to
survive to be able to collect interbank loans. Else, since it would not survive in state
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L L either and not gain anything in state H L , interbank loans would be at best useless.
Hence, {L H} /∈ Q1. If {L H} /∈ Q1, then Q2 = {H L, L L} implies that bank 1’s
financial constraint would be the same in the safe mode with b = 0. Hence, whether
b > 0 or b = 0 would not matter. Therefore, {L L} ⊂ Q1. Finally, assumption (3.2)
implies {H L} /∈ Q1, which leaves Q1 = {L L}.
F Comparative statics
Write Eqs. (5.14) and (5.15) as
E1 = α−(1−p1(1−p1)(1+ρ))λ1,Lα l1−Ω1
− (1−p1)(1−p1(1+ρ))p1 (l2−Ω2)
+ 1−p1(1−p1)(1+ρ)p1α
∫ l2
lR (Q2)2
[
(1−p1) λ2,L−φ′2(l2)
]
dl2
= 0, (F.1)
E2 = φ′1(l1) − p1(1−p1)(1 + ρ)λ1,L
− p1 ((1−p1)λ2,L−φ
′
2(l2))(α−(1−p1(1−p1)(1+ρ))λ1,L)
α(1−p1)(1−p1(1+ρ))−(1−p1(1−p1)(1+ρ))((1−p1)λ2,L−φ′2(l2))
= 0. (F.2)
By the general implicit function theorem, we obtain
dl1
dρ
=
∂E1
∂l2
∂E2
∂ρ
− ∂E2
∂l2
∂E1
∂ρ
∂E1
∂l1
∂E2
∂l2 − ∂E1∂l2 ∂E2∂l1
, (F.3)
dl2
dρ
=
∂E2
∂l1
∂E1
∂ρ
− ∂E1
∂l1
∂E2
∂ρ
∂E1
∂l1
∂E2
∂l2 − ∂E1∂l2 ∂E2∂l1
, (F.4)
with
∂E1
∂l1 =
α−(1−p1(1−p1)(1+ρ))λ1,L
α
> 0
∂E1
∂l2 = −
(1−p1)(1−p1(1+ρ))
p1 +
1−p1(1−p1)(1+ρ)
p1α
(
(1−p1) λ2,L−φ′2(l2)
)
< 0
∂E1
∂ρ
= p1(1−p1)1−p1(1−p1)(1+ρ) ((l1 − Ω1) + (l2−Ω2)) > 0
∂E2
∂l1 = φ′′1 (l1) < 0
∂E2
∂l2 =
α(1−p1)(1−p1(1+ρ))
Ξ
φ′1(l1)−p1(1−p1)(1+ρ)λ1,L
((1−p1)λ2,L−φ′2(l2)) φ
′′
2 (l2) < 0
∂E2
∂ρ
= −p1 (1 − p1) λ1,L
−p1 (1 − p1)
(
(1 − p1) λ2,L − φ′2(l2)
)
(
p1λ1,L−(φ′1(l1)−p1(1−p1)(1+ρ)λ1,L)(α+1)
Ξ
)
< 0
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where Ξ = α(1−p1)(1−p1(1 +ρ))− (1−p1(1−p1)(1 +ρ))((1−p1)λ2,L−φ′2(l2)).
The sign of ∂E1/∂l2 follows because if it would be positive in equilibrium it meant
that bank 1 could ease its funding constraint and lower the compensation payable to
bank 2 by making a smaller interbank loan such that bank 2 grants fewer loans.
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